We present as-strong-as-possible definitions of privacy, and constructions achieving them, for public-key encryption schemes where the encryption algorithm is deterministic. We obtain as a consequence database encryption methods that permit fast (i.e. sub-linear, and in fact logarithmic, time) search while provably providing privacy that is as strong as possible subject to this fast search constraint. One of our constructs, called RSA-DOAEP, has the added feature of being length preserving, so that it is the first example of a public-key cipher. We generalize this to obtain a notion of efficiently-searchable encryption schemes which permit more flexible privacy to search-time trade-offs via a technique called bucketization. Our results answer muchasked questions in the database community and provide foundations for work done there.
Introduction
The classical notions of privacy for public-key encryption schemes, namely indistinguishability or semantic security under chosen-plaintext or chosen-ciphertext attack [35, 44, 47, 28, 10] , can only be met when the encryption algorithm is randomized. This paper treats the case where the encryption algorithm is deterministic. We begin by discussing the motivating application.
Fast search. Remote data storage in outsourced databases is of increasing interest [51] . Data will be stored in encrypted form. (The database service provider is not trusted.) We are interested in a public key setting, where anyone can add to the database encrypted data which a distinguished "receiver" can retrieve and decrypt. The encryption scheme must permit search (by the receiver) for data retrieval. Public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [16, 1, 18 ] is a solution that provably provides strong privacy but search takes time linear in the size of the database. Given that databases can be terabytes in size, this is prohibitive. The practical community indicates that they want search on encrypted data to be as efficient as on unencrypted data, where a record containing a given field value can be retrieved in time logarithmic in the size of the database. (For example, via appropriate tree-based data structures.) Deterministic encryption allows just this. The encrypted fields can be stored in the data structure, and one can find a target ciphertext in time logarithmic in the size of the database. The question is what security one can expect. To answer this, we need a definition of privacy for deterministic encryption.
A definition. One possibility is to just ask for one-wayness, but we would like to protect partial information about the plaintext to the maximum extent possible. To gauge what this could be, we note two inherent limitations of deterministic encryption. First, no privacy is possible if the plaintext is known to come from a small space. Indeed, knowing that c is the encryption under public key pk of a plaintext x from a set X, the adversary can compute the encryption c x of x under pk for all x ∈ X, and return as the decryption of c the x satisfying c x = c. We address this by only requiring privacy when the plaintext is drawn from a space of large min-entropy. Second, and more subtle, is that the ciphertext itself is partial information about the plaintext. We address this by only requiring non-leakage of partial information when the plaintext and partial information do not depend on the public key. This is reasonable because in real life public keys are hidden in our software and data does not depend on them. We provide a semantic-security style definition of privacy for deterministic encryption that takes these issues into account. While certainly weaker than the classical notions met by randomized schemes, our notion, which we call PRIV, is still quite strong. The next question is how to achieve this new notion.
Constructions. Our first construction is generic and natural: Deterministically encrypt plaintext x by applying the encryption algorithm of a randomized scheme but using as coins a hash of (the public key and) x. We show that this "Encrypt-with-Hash" deterministic encryption scheme is PRIV secure in the random oracle (RO) model of [12] assuming the starting randomized scheme is IND-CPA secure. Our second construction is an extension of RSA-OAEP [13, 31] . The padding transform is deterministic but uses three Feistel rounds rather than the two of OAEP. RSA-DOAEP is proven PRIV secure in the RO model assuming RSA is one-way. This construction has the attractive feature of being length-preserving. (The length of the ciphertext equals the length of the plaintext.) This is important when bandwidth is expensive -senders in the database setting could be power-constrained devices-and for securing legacy code.
Historical context. Diffie and Hellman [26] suggested that one encrypt plaintext x by applying to it an injective trapdoor function. A deterministic encryption scheme is just a family of injective trapdoor functions, so our definition is an answer to the question of how much privacy DiffieHellman encryption can provide. ( We clarify that not all trapdoor functions meet our definition. For example, plain RSA does not.)
In the symmetric setting, deterministic encryption is captured by ciphers including block ciphers. So far there has been no public key analog. Deterministic encryption meeting our definition provides one, and in particular RSA-DOAEP is the first length-preserving public-key cipher.
Efficiently searchable encryption. We introduce the notion of efficiently searchable encryption (ESE) schemes. These are schemes permitting fast (i.e. logarithmic time) search. Encryption may be randomized, but there is a deterministic function of the plaintext that can also be computed from the ciphertext and serves as a "tag," permitting the usual (fast) comparison-based search. Deterministic encryption schemes are a special case and the notion of security remains the same. (Our PRIV definition does not actually require encryption to be deterministic.) The benefit of the generalization is to permit schemes with more flexible privacy to search-time trade-offs. Specifically, we analyze a scheme from the database literature that we call "Hash-and-Encrypt." It encrypts the plaintext with a randomized scheme but also includes in the ciphertext a deterministic, collision-resistant hash of the plaintext. (This is an ESE scheme with the hash playing the role of the tag, and so permits fast search.) We prove that this scheme is PRIV secure in the RO model when the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CPA. With this scheme, loss of privacy due to lack of entropy in the plaintext space can be compensated for by increasing the probability of hash collisions. (This can be done, for example, by using truncated output of the hash function.) The trade-off is that the receiver then also gets "false positives" in response to a search query and must spend the time to sift through them to obtain the true answer. This technique is known as bucketization in the database literature, but its security was not previously rigorously analyzed.
Discussion. Our schemes only provide privacy for plaintexts that have high min-entropy. (This is inherent in being deterministic or efficiently searchable, not a weakness of our particular constructs.) We do not claim database fields being encrypted have high min-entropy. They might or they might not. The point is that practitioners have indicated that they will not sacrifice search time for privacy. Our claim is to provide the best possible privacy subject to allowing fast search. In some cases, this may very well mean no privacy. But we also comment that bucketization can increase privacy (at the cost of extra processing by the receiver) when the database fields being encrypted do not have high min-entropy.
Extensions. Our basic PRIV definition, and the above-mentioned results, are all for the CPA (chosen-plaintext attack) case. The definition easily extends to the CCA (chosen-ciphertext attack) case, and we call the resulting notion PRIV-CCA. Our Encrypt-with-Hash deterministic encryption scheme is not just PRIV, but in fact PRIV-CCA, in the RO model even if the underlying randomized encryption scheme is only IND-CPA, as long as the latter has the extra property that no ciphertext is too likely. In Section 7 we detail this and also discuss how RSA-DOAEP and Encrypt-and-Hash fare under CCA.
Open question. All our constructs are in the RO model. An important open question is to construct ESE or deterministic encryption schemes meeting our definition in the standard model. We note that in the past also we have seen new notions first emerge only with RO constructions achieving them, but later standard model constructs have been found. This happened for example for IBE [15, 54] and PEKS [18] . Note that the results of [33] rule out a standard model blackbox reduction from deterministic public-key encryption to ordinary public-key encryption, but the former could still be built under other assumptions.
Related work. In the symmetric setting, deterministic encryption is both easier to define and to achieve than in the asymmetric setting. Consider the experiment that picks a random challenge bit b and key K and provides the adversary with a left-or-right oracle that, given plaintexts x 0 , x 1 returns the encryption of x b under K. Security asks that the adversary find it hard to guess b as long as its queries (x 1 0 , x 1 1 ), . . . , (x q 0 , x q 1 ) satisfy the condition that x 1 0 , . . . , x q 0 are all distinct and also x 1 1 , . . . , x q 1 are all distinct. To the best of our knowledge, this definition of privacy for deterministic symmetric encryption first appeared in [11] . However, it is met by a PRP and in this sense deterministic symmetric encryption goes back to [43] .
Previous searchable encryption schemes provably meeting well-defined notions of privacy include [16, 36, 1, 6, 17, 18] in the public-key setting and [52, 34, 23] in the symmetric setting. However, all these require linear-time search, meaning the entire database must be scanned to answer each query. In the symmetric setting, further assumptions such as the data being known in advance, and then having the user (who is both the "sender" and "reciever" in this setting) pre-compute a specialized index for the server, has been shown to permit efficiency comparable to ours without sacrificing security [24] . Follow-on work to ours [4] treats ESE (as we mean it here) in the symmetric setting, providing the symmetric analog of what we do in our current paper.
Sub-linear time searchable encryption has been much targeted by the database security community [45, 3, 37, 25, 39, 40, 42, 38, 20, 53] . However, they mostly employ weak, non-standard or nonexisting primitives and lack definitions or proofs of security. As a notable exception, Kantarcioglu and Clifton [41] recently called for a new direction of research on secure database servers aiming instead for "efficient encrypted database and query processing with provable security properties." They also propose a new cryptographic definition that ensures schemes reveal only the number of records accessed on each query, though a scheme meeting the definition requires tamper-resistant trusted hardware on the server.
Definitions that, like ours, restrict security to high min-entropy plaintexts have appeared before, specifically in the contexts of perfectly one-way probabilistic hash functions (POWHFs) [21, 22] and information-theoretically secure one-time symmetric encryption [49, 27] . The first however cannot be met by deterministic schemes, and neither handle the public-key related subtleties we mentioned above. (Namely that we must limit security to plaintexts not depending on the public key.) Also our definition considers the encryption of multiple related messages while those of [21, 22] consider only independent messages.
Use for other applications. We note that one can also use our definitions to analyze other systems-security applications. In particular, a notion of "convergent encryption" is proposed in [2, 29] for the problem of eliminating wasted space in an encrypted file system by combining duplicate files across multiple users. Despite providing some correct intuition for security of their scheme, they are only able to formally show (for lack of a suitable security definition) that it achieves the very weak security notion of one-wayness. One can use our definitions to show that their scheme achieves much stronger security.
Versions of this paper and corrections. This full version of the paper corrects several typos and mistakes from the preliminary version [9] , as well as includes all omitted proofs from the latter. Section 6, in particular the part of Section 6.1 treating bucketization, is significantly revised in this full version. We had to withdraw Theorem 4 of the proceedings version, which we are not able to prove. The latter is replaced here by Theorem 6.2. Although it does not cover as general a case as was claimed in the preliminary version, it still makes significant headway in this direction. (See Section 6.1 for more details.)
Notation and Conventions
Unless otherwise indicated, an adversary or algorithm may be randomized. An adversary is either an algorithm or a tuple of algorithms. In the latter case, we say it is polynomial time if each constituent algorithm is polynomial time. Unless otherwise indicated, an adversary or algorithm is polynomial time. By convention, the running-time of an adversary includes both its actual running-time and the time to run its overlying experiment. We let "A(. . .) ⇒ z" denote the event that algorithm A outputs z when run on the elided arguments. If x is a string then |x| denotes its length in bits. We let x[i . . . j] denote bits i through j of string x, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |x|. By x 1 · · · x n we denote an encoding of x 1 , . . . , x n from which x 1 , . . . , x n are uniquely recoverable. Vectors are denoted in boldface, for example x. If x is a vector then |x| denotes the number of components of x and x[i] denotes its ith component (1 ≤ i ≤ |x|).
Asymmetric encryption. An (asymmetric) encryption scheme Π = (K, E, D) consists of three algorithms. The key-generation algorithm K takes input the unary encoding 1 k of the security parameter k to return a public key pk and matching secret key sk. The encryption algorithm E takes 1 k , pk and a plaintext x to return a ciphertext. The deterministic decryption algorithm D takes 1 k , pk, sk and a ciphertext c to return a plaintext. We require that D(1 k , pk, sk, c) = x for all k and all x ∈ PtSp(k), where the probability is over the experiment (pk, sk)
and PtSp is a plaintext space associated to Π. Unless otherwise indicated, we assume PtSp(k) = {0, 1} * for all k. We extend E to vectors via Algorithm E(pk, x)
We say that Π is deterministic if E is deterministic.
Standard security notions. Let Π = (K, E, D) be an encryption scheme and let LR be the oracle that on input m 0 , m 1 , b returns m b . We associate to an adversary B and a bit b the following:
We call B an IND-CPA adversary if every query m 0 , m 1 it makes to its LR oracle satisfies |m 0 | = |m 1 | and an IND-CCA adversary if in addition it never queries to D(1 k , pk, sk, ·) a ciphertext c previously returned by the LR oracle. For atk ∈ {cpa, cca}, the advantage of an IND-atk adversary B is
A standard conditioning argument shows that Note that the definition of IND-CPA (or -CCA) allows an adversary to make as many queries as it likes to its LR-oracle. This is known to be equivalent (with loss in security by a factor less than or equal to the total number of LR-queries made) to allowing only one such query [8] .
Game-playing. Our security analyses often employ the code-based game-playing technique of [14] . We recall some game-related language and conventions from [14] that we will use.
A game consists of an Initialize procedure, procedures that respond to an adversary's oracle queries, and a Finalize procedure. In a proof, one typically considers a sequence of games G 1 , . . . , G n . The adversary is executed with each of these games, its execution with G i being determined as follows. First, the Initialize procedure executes, and its outputs, as given by the Return statement, are passed as inputs to the adversary. Now the latter executes, oracle queries being answered by the procedures for this purpose associated to G i . The output of the adversary becomes the input to the Finalize procedure of G i . The output of the game is whatever is returned by the Finalize procedure.
We let "G A i ⇒s" denote the event that the output of Game G i when executed with an adversary A is s. Both for the games and for the adversary, we adopt the convention that boolean variables are automatically initialized to false and arrays begin everywhere undefined.
Deterministic Encryption and its Security
Privacy adversaries. A privacy adversary A = (A m , A g ) is a pair of algorithms. We clarify that A m , A g share neither coins nor state. A m takes input 1 k but not the public key, and returns a plaintext vector x together with some side information t. A g takes input 1 k , pk and an encryption of x under pk, and tries to compute t.
The adversary must obey the following rules. First, there must exist functions v(·), n(·) such that |x| = v(k) and |x[i]| = n(k) for k, all (x, t) output by A m (1 k ), and all 1 ≤ i ≤ v(k). Second, all plaintext vectors must have the same equality pattern, meaning for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ v(k) there is a symbol 3 ∈ {=, =} such that
, all k, and all x ∈ {0, 1} * . We say that A has high min-entropy if µ(k) ∈ ω(log(k)). The definition below is for chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA). In Section 7 we extend the definition to take chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) into account.
The definition. Let Π = (K, E, D) be an encryption scheme. Although this is an important case of interest, the definition that follows does not assume Π to be deterministic. The definition is in the semantic-security style of [35] . Let A be a privacy adversary as above. We associate to A, Π the following:
The advantage of a privacy adversary A against Π is
Again, a standard conditioning argument shows that
where the probability is over a random choice of bit b and the coins of the experiment. We say that Π is PRIV secure if Adv priv Π,A (·) is negligible for every PTA A with high min-entropy. As usual, in the random oracle (RO) model [12] , all algorithms and adversaries are given access to the RO(s). In particular, both A m and A g get this access. Let us now discuss some noteworthy aspects of the new definition.
Access to the public key. If A m were given pk, the definition would be unachievable for deterministic Π. Indeed, A m (1 k ) could output (x, t) where x [1] is chosen at random from {0, 1} k , |x| = 1, and t = E(pk, x). Then A g (1 k , pk, c) could return c, and A would have min-entropy k but
Intuitively, the ciphertext is non-trivial information about the plaintext, showing that any deterministic scheme leaks information about the plaintext that depends on the public key. Our definition asks that information unrelated to the public key not leak. Note that this also means that we provide security only for messages unrelated to the public key, which is acceptable in practice because normal data is unlikely to depend on any public key. In real life, public keys are abstractions hidden in our software, not strings we look at.
Vectors of messages. The classical definitions explicitly only model the encryption of a single plaintext, but a simple hybrid argument from [8] shows that security when multiple plaintexts are encrypted follows. This hybrid argument fails in our setting, and in fact the two versions are not equivalent, which is why we have explicitly considered the encryption of multiple messages. To be more precise, let us say that Π is PRIV1 secure if Adv priv Π,A (·) is negligible for every privacy adversary A = (A m , A g ) satisfying
for all k ∈ N. We claim that PRIV1 security does not imply PRIV security. To prove this, we now give an example of an encryption scheme Π which is PRIV1 secure but not PRIV secure. We obtain Π = (K, E , D) by modifying a given deterministic PRIV secure encryption scheme Π = (K, E, D). Specifically, we define:
Above and in what follows, s denotes the bitwise complement of a string s. The assumption that Π is PRIV secure implies that Π is PRIV1 secure. However, the following attack shows Π is not PRIV secure. Consider A m (1 k ) that picks m 1 , m 2 from {0, 1} k and a bit b at random, and
The high min-entropy requirement. In the absence of the high-entropy restriction on A, it is clear that the definition would be unachievable for deterministic Π. To see this, consider A m (1 k ) that outputs (0, 0) with probability 1/2 and (1, 1) with probability 1/2. Then A g (1 k , pk, c) could return 0 if E(pk, 0) = c and 1 otherwise, giving A an advantage of 1/2. This reflects the fact that trial encryption of candidate messages is always a possible attack when encryption is deterministic.
Security for multiple users. The classical notions of privacy, as well as ours, only model a single user (SU) setting, where there is just one receiver and thus just one public key. An extension of the classical notions to cover multiple users, each with their own public key, is made in [8, 7] , and these works go on to show that SU security implies multi-user (MU) security in this case. We leave it open to appropriately extend our definition to the MU setting and then answer the following questions: does SU security imply MU security, and do our schemes achieve MU security? But we conjecture that the answer to the first question is "no," while the answer to the second is "yes."
A Useful Fact
Define the max public-key probability mpk(·) AE of AE as follows: for every k, we let mpk AE be the maximum, taken over all w ∈ {0, 1} * , of the quantity Pr pk = w : (pk, sk)
The following shows that mpk AE (·) is negligible for any IND-CPA scheme.
be an encryption scheme. Then there is an IND-CPA adversary B such that
Furthermore, the running-time of B is at that for O(1) computations of K, D, and B makes one LR-query.
We clarify that (1) is a relationship between functions of k, so we are saying it holds for all k ∈ N.
For simplicity of notation we omit k here and further in the paper in similar instances.
Proof: Adversary B works as follows:
Pr Exp
Subtracting, we get
as desired.
Secure Deterministic Encryption Schemes
We propose two constructions of deterministic schemes that we prove secure under our definition.
Encrypt-with-Hash
We first propose a generic deterministic encryption scheme that replaces the coins used by a standard encryption scheme with the hash of the message. More formally, let AE = (K, E, D) be any public-key encryption scheme. Say that E(1 k , pk, x) draws its coins from a set Coins pk (|x|). We write E(1 k , pk, x; R) for the output of E on inputs pk, x and coins R. Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * be a hash function with the property that H(pk x) ∈ Coins pk (|x|) for all pk, x ∈ {0, 1} * . The RO-model "Encrypt-with-Hash" deterministic encryption scheme EwH = (K, DE, DD) is defined via
The following implies that the Encrypt-with-Hash construction achieves PRIV-security if the starting encryption scheme is IND-CPA and has negligible max public-key probability.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose there is a privacy adversary A = (A m , A g ) against EwH with min-entropy µ, which outputs vectors of size v with components of length n and makes at most q h queries to its hash oracle. Then there exists an IND-CPA adversary B against AE such that
where mpk AE is the max public-key probability of AE. Furthermore, B makes v queries to its LR-oracle and its running-time is at most that of A plus O(vn).
The proof is readily obtained from the proof of Theorem 7.1, which is in Appendix D. (We comment in the latter in more detail about the differences.) Although Proposition 4.1 shows that any IND-CPA encryption scheme has negligible max public-key probability, the reduction is not tight. For most specific schemes, one can in fact easily and unconditionally (meaning, without assumption) show that the max public-key probability is asymptotically small. For example, in ElGamal [30] , the public key contains a value g x , where x is a random exponent in the secret key. In this case, the max public-key probability is 1/|G|, where |G| is the order of the corresponding group.
RSA-DOAEP, A length-preserving deterministic scheme
It is sometimes important to minimize the number of bits transmitted over the network. We devise an efficient deterministic encryption scheme that is optimal in this regard, namely is lengthpreserving. (That is, the length of the ciphertext equals the length of the plaintext.) Lengthpreserving schemes can also be needed for securing legacy code. Ours is the first such construction shown secure under a definition of security substantially stronger than one-wayness, and in particular is the first construction of an asymmetric cipher.
RSA and its security. We recall some background on the RSA function [48] . An RSA trapdoorpermutation generator security parameter k is an algorithm F that on input 1 k returns (N, e), (N, d) where N is the product of two distinct k/2-bit primes and ed ≡ 1 mod φ(N ). (Here φ(·) is Euler's phi function.) An inverter I against F is algorithm that takes input 1 k , (N, e), x e mod φ(N ) and tries to compute x. RSA trapdoor permutation generator F is one-way if for every I the function:
is negligible.
The scheme. Our construction is based on RSA-OAEP [13, 31] . But in place of the randomness in this scheme we use part of the message, and we add an extra round to the underlying transform. Formally, the scheme is parameterized by functions k 0 (·), k 1 (·) > 0. The plaintext space PtSp(k) consists of all strings of length at least max(k 1 (k), 2k 0 (k)+1). We assume here for simplicity that all messages to encrypt have a fixed length n = n(k) satisfying n > 2k 0 and n ≥ k 1 . Let F be an RSA trapdoor-permutation generator with modulus length to k 1 = k. The key-generation algorithm of the associated RO-model deterministic encryption scheme RSA-DOAEP ("D" for "deterministic") runs F and returns (N, e) as the public key and (N, d) as the secret key. Its encryption and decryption algorithms have oracle access to functions H 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k 0 and R : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n−k 0 , and are defined as follows (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the encryption algorithm): Security. The following implies that RSA-DOAEP achieves PRIV-security if RSA is one-way.
Theorem 5.2 Suppose there exists a privacy adversary A = (A m , A g ) against RSA-DOAEP with min-entropy µ that makes at most q h i queries to oracle H i for i ∈ {1, 2} and q r to oracle R, and outputs vectors of size v with components of length n. Let q tot = q h 1 + q r + q h 2 . We consider two cases:
• Case 1: n < k 0 + k 1 . Then there is an inverter I against RSA trapdoor-permutation generator F such that
Furthermore the running-time of I is at most twice that of A plus O(log v + q h 2 log q h 2 + k 3 1 ).
• Case 2: n ≥ k 0 + k 1 . Then there is an inverter I against RSA trapdoor-permutation generator F such that
Furthermore, the running-time of I is at most that of A plus O(log v + q h 2 log q h 2 ).
The proof is in Appendix A. In practice, we will have e.g. k 1 = 1024, and then we can set parameter k 0 to, say, 160 bits to effectively maximize security in either case of the theorem. Then, for a given application, the relation between n − 160 and 1024 then determines which case of the theorem applies. We note that the weaker security guarantee in Case 1 is analogous to the state-of-the-art for RSA-OAEP itself [31, 46] .
Encrypting long messages. Typically, to encrypt long messages efficiently using an asymmetric scheme in practice, one employs hybrid encryption. This methodology in particular applies to the Encrypt-with-Hash construction, in which the starting scheme can be a hybrid one. However, if using hybrid encryption, RSA-DOAEP would no longer be length-preserving (since an encrypted symmetric key would need to be included with the ciphertext). We therefore stress that one can efficiently encrypt long messages using RSA-DOAEP without making use of hybrid encryption. Intuitively, this is possible because the underlying Feistel network in the scheme acts like an "allor-nothing transform" [19] , such that unless an adversary with high min-entropy inverts the RSA image in a ciphertext then it cannot recover any information about the (long) message.
Efficiently Searchable Encryption (ESE)
We now turn to the application to outsourced databases, where data is sent to a remote server. The database server is untrusted. The data in each field in the database is to be encrypted separately under the public key of a receiver, who needs to be able to query the server and retrieve encrypted records containing particular data efficiently. Encrypting the data deterministically provides a possible solution to this problem. The database can be then organized into a standard (e.g. treebased) data structure, and a query, i.e. a ciphertext, specifies the exact piece of data the server needs to locate, so the sever can find it (in say logarithmic time) just like for unencrypted data. In general, though, encryption permitting efficient search does not to be deterministic per se. Accordingly, we first define a more general primitive we call efficiently searchable encryption (ESE).
The new primitive. The idea is to associate a (deterministic) "tag" to each plaintext, which can be computed both from the plaintext and from a ciphertext that encrypts it. The server can compute the tag of a ciphertext to be stored in the database and use it to store the ciphertext appropriately in a data structure. To query a plaintext, the receiver can compute and send its tag, which the server can look up in the data structure, returning any matches and associated data. (The receiver can then decrypt these matches and filter out any false-positives, i.e. ciphertexts with the same tag as the query but which do not decrypt to the intended plaintext.) These two functionalities are captured by the functions F, G below.
Let AE = (K, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme with associated plaintext space PtSp(·). We say AE is a δ-efficiently searchable encryption (-ESE) scheme for some function δ(·) < 1 if there exist deterministic algorithms F, G such that for every k we have 1. Perfect Consistency: For every k and x 1 ∈ PtSp(k), the probability that the following experiment returns 1 is 1:
Computational Soundness: For every k and every algorithm M that on input 1 k outputs a pair of distinct messages in PtSp(k), the probability that the following experiment returns 1 is at most δ(k):
We refer to the output of F, G as the tag of the message or a corresponding ciphertext.
Above, consistency ensures that the server locates at least the desired ciphertext(s) on a query, because their tags and those of the plaintext used to form the query are the same. Soundness limits the number of false-positives located as well; if using a δ-ESE scheme, for a size n database we expect to have at most δ · n false-positives on a query, over the choice of data in the database and of the query (both not depending on the remaining), and key-generation and encryption computations. The reasoning for this is as follows. Given query F (pk, x), define for each ciphertext c in the database such that D(1 k , pk, sk, c) = x the random variable X c taking value 1 if F (pk, x) = G(pk, c) and 0 otherwise. Define X = c X c . The expected number of false positives on the query is then
where the equality is by linearity of expectation and the first inequality follows from soundness.
Indeed, any deterministic encryption scheme is a 0-ESE scheme under our definition. Hence the two deterministic encryption schemes we studied, namely Encrypt-with-Hash and RSA-DOAEP, represent two particular 0-ESE schemes. To see this, let DPE = (K, DE, D) be any deterministic public-key encryption scheme. Then letting F and G be the algorithms that on inputs pk, m and pk, DE(pk, m), respectively, return DE(pk, m), we see that DPE is 0-efficiently-searchable. That is, the function δ is identically 0 here, due consistency of encryption.
However, for other ESE schemes δ may be large. This is why M is not given input pk in the soundness condition; if it were, the condition would not make sense for large δ, because then M could compute tags of messages itself and just output two it finds to agree on their tags. As in our definition of privacy, this restriction is reasonable because real data and queries are unlikely to depend on any public key.
Security of ESE.
As our PRIV does not actually require the encryption scheme in question to be deterministic, we can also use it for ESE. Here the rule that a privacy adversary output vectors with the same equality pattern means, intuitively, that we allow the server to learn only which records in the database contain the same field values and how many times each such value occurs (called the occurrence profile of the data), so that it is able to efficiently search. In contrast to deterministic encryption, we will see that using an ESE scheme with large δ can increase privacy (at the cost of more processing by the receiver on a query) when database fields being encrypted do not have high min-entropy.
Encrypt-and-Hash ESE
We formalize and analyze a probabilistic ESE scheme based on an approach from the database literature in which one appends a (deterministic) hash of the plaintext to a ciphertext to enable efficient search. Let AE = (K, E, D) be any pubic-key encryption scheme and H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l for some l > 0 be a hash function. The RO-model "Encrypt-and-Hash" encryption scheme EaH = (K, HE, HD) is defined via
Then EaH is a 2 −l -ESE scheme. For this, we let F, G be the algorithms that on inputs pk, x and pk, E(pk, x) H(pk x), respectively, return the tag H(pk x); the fact that δ is identically 2 −l here follows from the fact that H is a RO with output length l.
The following implies that this construct is PRIV secure if the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CPA, independent of l.
where mpk AE is the max public-key probability of AE. Furthermore, B makes v queries to its LR-oracle and its running-time is at most that of A.
The proof is in Appendix B.
Bucketization. Theorem 6.1 tells us that EaH achieves PRIV if plaintexts being encrypted have high min-entropy. But in the case that they do not, one can try to compensate for this by decreasing the length of the hash l (at the cost of more processing by the receiver on a query), resulting in more plaintexts with the same tag. This technique is known as bucketization in the database literature. Intuitively, the scheme may then provide some privacy, even for small message spaces, if an efficient adversary cannot distinguish with too high a probability between ciphertexts whose tags are equal.
In the proceedings version of this paper [9] , we incorrectly claimed a general bound on the advantage of a privacy adversary A against EaH with hash length l > 0. In fact, our analysis applies only to case that the adversary outputs vectors of size 1 and is interested in recovering the entire message from the ciphertext. The corrected theorem is given below; we leave it open to extend our techniques to the more general case.
Say A = (A m , A g ) is a message-recovery (MR) privacy adversary if the output of A m is always of the form (x, x) for a string x. Suppose A m of a MR privacy adversary A puts a distribution D on a finite set of plaintexts S. Let S = {m 1 , . . . m M } and p i be the probability assigned to m i by D, meaning A m outputs (m i , m i ) with probability p i . Intuitively, one cannot expect bucketization to increase privacy in all cases because D may be too concentrated at a particular m i . Then, if the adversary sees a ciphertext whose tag is the same as the hash of m i , it can deduce the latter decrypts to m i with very high probability. But we show that as long as D is sufficiently "spread out" over S then bucketization can indeed increase privacy, even if |S| is not too large. The metric we use to measure this is the collision probability
Theorem 6.2 Suppose there is a MR privacy adversary A = (A m , A g ) such that A m puts distribution D on a finite set of plaintexts S. Then there exists an IND-CPA adversary B against AE such that
Furthermore, B makes one query to its LR-oracle and its running-time is at most that of A.
The proof is in Appendix C. Note that it follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality that 1/|S| ≤ Coll [ D ] above, with equality just when A m puts a uniform distribution on S. So, the closer the collision probability of D is to that of the uniform distribution on S, the better our bound. Indeed, it can be shown that the closer the former is to the latter, the "closer" D is to the uniform distribution on S itself.
We remark that one cannot use a POWHF [21, 22] to compute the tags in place of the RO in the Encrypt-and-Hash construction, because POWHFs are randomized and this will violate the consistency requirement of ESE.
CCA and Other Extensions
Our definition, and so far our security proofs, are for the CPA case. Here we discuss extensions to the CCA case and then other extensions such as to hash functions rather than encryption schemes.
PRIV-CCA. Extend Exp

priv-b
Π,A (k) to give A g on input 1 k , pk, c oracle access to D(1 k , pk, sk, ·), for b ∈ {0, 1}, which it can query on any string not appearing as a component of c. Note that A m does not get this decryption oracle. Then let
Again, a standard conditioning argument shows that
We say that Π is PRIV-CCA secure if Adv priv-cca Π,A (·) is negligible for every A with high min-entropy.
Encrypt-with-Hash. Deterministic encryption scheme EwH is PRIV-CCA secure even if the starting encryption scheme is only IND-CPA but meets an extra condition, namely that no ciphertext occurs with too high a probability. More precisely, the max-ciphertext probability mc(·) of AE = (K, E, D) is defined as follows: we let mc AE (k) be the maximum taken over all y ∈ {0, 1} * and all x ∈ PtSp(k) of the quantity Pr (pk, sk)
Then Theorem 5.1 extends as follows.
Theorem 7.1 Suppose there is a PRIV-CCA adversary A = (A m , A g ) against EwH with minentropy µ, which outputs vectors of size v with components of length n and makes at most q h queries to its hash oracle and at most q d queries to its decryption oracle. Let mpk AE and mc AE be max public-key and max-ciphertext probabilities of AE, respectively. Then there exists an IND-CPA adversary B against AE such that
Furthermore, B makes v queries to its LR-oracle and its running-time is at most that of A plus O(vn + q h T E ), where T E is the time for one computation of E on a message of length n.
The proof is given in Appendix D.
The requirement that mc AE (·) be small is quite mild. Most practical encryption schemes have negligible max-ciphertext probability. For example, the "no-authenticity," IND-CPA version of RSA-OAEP [14] has max-ciphertext probability equal to 1/2 n(k) , where n(·) is the length of the messages to encrypt, and ElGamal [32] has max-ciphertext probability 1/|G|, where G is the used group. Thus in practice this does not amount to any extra assumption. Moreover, in general any IND-CPA scheme AE = (K, E, D) can be easily modified to achieve this property. Specifically, define:
IND-CPA security of AE * follows from IND-CPA security of AE, but mc AE * = 2 −k . On the other hand, IND-CPA security does not imply low max-ciphertext probability in general. To prove this, we start with an IND-CPA scheme AE = (K, E, D) and modify it to obtain a scheme AE ′ that is still IND-CPA but has high max-ciphertext probability (namely mc AE ′ = 1). Scheme AE ′ = (K, E ′ , D ′ ) works as follows:
Above, we assume that "0" is a special ciphertext not output by E(1 k , pk, ·) for all k ∈ N and pk output by K(1 k ). It is easy to see that AE ′ is IND-CPA but mc AE ′ = 1. RSA-DOAEP. Scheme RSA-DOAEP is not PRIV-CCA, because there is a chosen-ciphertext attack against it. Denote by DOAEP the three-round Feistel network underlying the scheme and DOAEP −1 its inverse. Consider PRIV-CCA adversary A = (A m , A g ) against RSA-DOAEP that works as follows:
Above, n is as defined in Subsection 5.2, and, for simplicity, we do not explicitly denote RO access of the algorithms. Adversary A is efficient and has min-entropy n but PRIV-CCA advantage 1− 1/2 n . However, it is straightforward to show that when properly combined in the "encrypt-then-sign" fashion with a secure digital signature, RSA-DOAEP does achieve PRIV-CCA in a natural "outsider security" model analogous to that in [5] . This may come at no additional cost, for example in the outsourced database application, which also requires authenticity anyway.
Extensions to other primitives. One can apply (as we do in the proof of Theorem 6.2) our PRIV definition to a more general primitive that we call a (public-key) hiding scheme, which we define as a pair HIDE = (Kg, F) of algorithms, where Kg on input 1 k outputs a key K and F takes 1 k , K and an input x to return an output we call the ciphertext. Note that every public-key encryption scheme (K, E, D) has an associated hiding scheme where Kg runs K to receive output (pk, sk) and then returns pk, and F(1 k , K, ·) is the same as E (1 k , pk, ·) . In general, though, a hiding scheme is not required to be invertible, covering for example the case of hash functions.
Encrypt-and-Hash. PRIV-CCA security of ESE scheme EaH requires IND-CCA security of the starting encryption scheme AE in general, in which case the analogous statements to the theorems in Section 6.1 hold when considering CCA attacks. (In other words, if the starting encryption scheme is IND-CCA then EaH is PRIV-CCA, and more specifically the same bounds as in the theorems hold for PRV-CCA adversaries in this case.) We comment in the proofs of the former how on the proofs change in the CCA case.
In fact, the basic construct generalizes to using any deterministic hiding scheme HIDE = (Kg, F) as defined above in place of the RO in EaH, where we replace a query H(pk, x) in the scheme by F(K, (pk, x)). Let us call the resulting scheme EaH HIDE . Theorem 6.1 then generalizes as follows. 
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.1, in Appendix B. We define three adversaries, namely B, A ′ = (A ′ m , A ′ g ), B ′ as follows:
The proof is a hybrid argument. Consider modified schemes EaH i = (K ′ , E i ) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} defined as follows. Each EaH i has the same key-generation algorithm, namely K ′ , which on input 1 k outputs (pk, K) where (pk, sk)
The encryption algorithms operate on vectors of size v, and are defined as follows:
Above, 0 denotes the size-v vector with each component 0 n , and F is extended to vectors componentwise analogously to encryption, as is "· ·" where both arguments are vectors. Consider a game with A and scheme EaH i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} that goes as follows: 
Now we write
To bound the right-hand side above, taking into account the definition of the advantages of B, A ′ , B ′ we have
We substitute these into (6) to get 
Now assuming wlog that
and combining-like terms completes the proof.
In the RO model, it is easy to construct a PRIV secure deterministic hiding scheme HIDE ′ = (Kg ′ , F ′ ) by setting Kg ′ on input 1 k to output a random K ∈ {0, 1} k and F ′ on input 1 k , K, x to return H(K x), where H is a RO. But Theorem 6.1 says we can do better than scheme EaH HIDE ′ in this case, in the sense that K can be dropped and H(K x) replaced with H(pk x). However, the analysis in this case (given in Appendix B) is slightly more involved.
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[51] Arsenal Digital Solutions. Since RSA-DOAEP is deterministic, we assume wlog that the plaintext components of a vector x are distinct for all (x, t) output by A m (1 k ). We prove Case 1, meaning we suppose that n − k 0 < k 1 .
(This is used in the lemma below.) Case 1 is the "harder" case in the sense that we need to use Lemma 6 from [31] . To state this, we call a partial one-way adversary I ′ an algorithm that takes input (N, e), x e mod φ(N ) and tries to compute just the last k 1 − (n − k 0 ) bits of x. (The fact that it computes the last n − k 0 bits of x is just for convenience; [31] actually proves something general.)
. For a partial one-way adversary I ′ , define
Intuitively, the lemma says that RSA is one-way if it is partial one-way (and n − k 0 is large enough relative to k 1 ).
Lemma A.1 [31, Lemma 6] Let F be an RSA trapdoor permutation generator with modulus length k 1 and let I ′ be a partial one-way adversary against F. Then there exists an inverter I against F such that
Furthermore, the running-time of I is at most twice that of I ′ plus O(k 3 1 ).
For the proof, we construct a partial one-way adversary against F and then conclude the existence of an inverter I by the lemma. The former, which we call GetQuery, is depicted in Figure 5 . The main games for the proof begin in Figure 2 and are continued in Figure 3 .
Equation (3) of Theorem 5.2 follows from the following sequence of inequalities, which we will justify below:
As we have seen, the advantage of A is also equal to 2p − 1 where p is the probability that the adversary correctly guesses the challenge bit b in a game where we pick b at random and run the adversary with the first experiment if b = 1 and the second if b = 0. Equation (7) follows from the fact that Game G 1 is just this game written in a convenient way. (The reasoning here is similar to in the proof of Theorem 5.1. We clarify that the two runs of A m in the game have different coins but the same arrays H 1 , R, H 2 are used for the ROs, so they have the same ROs.)
Games G 1 , G 2 differ only in statements that follow the setting of bad 0 , meaning are, in the terminology of [14] , identical-until-bad 0 games. The Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [14] thus applies to justify (8) . Let us denote by mpk F the max public-key probability of RSA-DOAEP (which only depends on the underlying RSA trapdoor-permutation generator F and not on the rest of the scheme). The probability H 1 [(N, e) x i,r ], R[(N, e) s i,0 ] or H 2 [(N, e) t i,0 ] for some i ∈ {1, . . . , v} is defined, meaning the array index was queried by A m to its RO, is at most 2q · mpk F because A m , which makes a total of at most q tot queries to all its ROs combined, gets no information about public key (N, e). (The factor of 2 is due to the fact that A m is run twice.) This justifies (9) .
As before, the Fundamental Lemma applies to justify (10) . To bound the probability that Game G 2 when executing A g sets bad 1 , note that without A g querying (N, e) x i,r (by which we mean for some i ∈ {1, . . . v}) to oracle H 1 nor (N, e) t i,0 to H 2 (i.e. up to the point that bad 1 is set), the values of H * i,1 , H * i,2 , s i,1 , t i,0 are all random and independently distributed from x b from its perspective. To be more precise, we define an auxilliary game called G rand , shown in Figure 4 , in which all input to A g and answers to its oracle queries are independent and random of x b and the appropriate independent and dependent variables defined by the game are swapped. We claim that the probability G 2 when executing A g sets bad 1 is at most the probability that G rand does. To see this, we can wlog consider a common finite space of coins associated to the executions games G 2 and G rand with A g where if G 2 when executed using some particular sequence of coins from this space sets bad 1 then G rand when executed using this same coin sequence also sets bad 1 , because the executions of the games on these coin sequences are identical. So the probability of setting bad 1 in G rand can only go up as compared to G 2 . Now, since when executed with G rand , A g gets no information about s * i,0 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ v, the probability that G rand when executing A g sets bad 1 is at most q r v/2 k 0 , giving (11) .
Equation (12) is again obtained via the Fundamental Lemma in [14] . We bound the probability that G 3 when executing A g sets bad 2 by showing that the latter implies A g has "guessed" x b [i] without being given any information about it, as follows. This probability is at most the probability that G rand does, by an analogous argument to the above. But the probability of that G rand sets bad 2 is, in turn, the same, over a common finite set of coins with which A g is executed, as the probability that the "knowledge extractor" K shown in Figure 6 outputs a list containing the plaintext x b [i] for some 1 ≤ i ≤ v, where x 0 , x 1 , b are defined as in G rand . The probability that K outputs such a list is at most q h 1 q r v/2 µ , because it gets no information about x b . So we have justified (13) . (We remark that this was the step in the proof where we use the fact that the underlying padding transform of RSA-DOAEP consists of three Feistel rounds and not two.)
As usual, the Fundamental Lemma in [14] applies to justify all of (14), (15), and (17) . We delay bounding the probabilities here until later.
Next consider when A g executed with Game G 6 queries (N, e) x i,r to H 1 but prior to this has queried neither (N, e) s i,0 to R nor (N, e) t i,0 to H 2 . Then, in reply to query (N, e) x i,r , it receives H * i,1 , which is random and independent from everything given to A g so far. Then, after it queries (N, e) x i,r to H 1 , we see from the code that the answers given to A g in reply to any of its queries are likewise random and independent. This means that, instead replying to query (N, e) x i,r with the special string H * i,1 defined at the beginning of the game, we could simply reply with a random and independent string chosen "on the fly" during the particular invocation of the procedure to respond to H 1 queries. In other words, we may drop the "Else" statement in this procedure to result in an equivalent game G 6 , which justifies (16) . Now, we have that the probability that G 8 outputs the challenge bit b chosen randomly at the beginning of the game when executing A g is at most 1/2, because this game does not give A g any information about x b , giving (18) .
Finally, observe that in each of the following cases, the probability that A g causes the relevant game to set the flag also causes G rand to do so with at least the same probability: game G 4 sets bad 3 , game G 5 sets bad 4 , and game G 7 sets bad 5 . The argument here is analogous to the justification of (11) . Moreover, these cases exhaust all the possible sequences of queries made by A g for which A g queries (N, e) t i,0 for some i to its H 2 oracle. Now the input to A g and its oracle replies are distributed identically when executed with G rand and when run by algorithm GetQuery, except that the procedure to respond to queries to H 2 in G rand explicitly checks whether a query made by A g is equal to t i,0 for some i, whereas algorithm GetQuery simply guesses whether this is the case by picking j when the first such query (which it hopes is t w,0 ) will occur, at which point its output is determined. (Game G rand also defines some additional variables, makes some "If" checks, and sets some flags omitted by GetQuery, but none of these influence game output.) Since w, j are random and independent and A g gets no information about them, we have Pr[G Finally, we proceed to bound the max public-key probability of RSA-DOAEP as follows. We first recall the following fact, which can be derived from a proof of Chebyshev's theorem about the density of primes (see [50, Theorem 5.3 
]).
Fact A.2 Let π(n) be the number of prime numbers less than or equal to an integer n. Then for all n π(n) ≥ 2n ln(n) .
Claim A.3 Let mpk F denote the max public-key probability of scheme RSA-DOAEP with modulus length k 1 = k. Then
Proof: Fix some k 1 /2-bit prime numbers p ′ , q ′ . We have that
as desired. Above, the second line is by unique factorization and the last uses Fact A.2.
Applying Claim A.3 to (20) and re-arranging yields (3). To finish the proof, we justify the runningtime analysis of I by taking into account the convention that the running-time of A includes that of its overlying experiment. Additional time-complexity for GetQuery here is for picking two random numbers between 1 and q h 2 , v, respectively, and maintaining a counter up to value at most q h 2 , incremented each time A g makes a query to oracle H 2 , which is O(log v + q h 2 log q h 2 ). Then applying the running-time analysis in Lemma A.1, we have that the running-time of I twice that of GetQuery plus O(k 3 1 ), as desired.
B Proof of Theorem 6.1
We actually define two adversaries, namely B, B ′ , for the proof, as shown below. At the conclusion of the proof, we comment on how to extend it to the CCA case.
Let g be the output of A g If g = t 1 then return 1 Else return 0
Let g be the output of A g If g = t 0 then return 1 Else return 0 Above, 0 denotes the size-v vector with each component 0 n . We clarify that the two runs of A m , in each of B, B ′ , have different coins but the same array H is used for the RO, so they have the same RO. The proof is a hybrid argument. Consider modified schemes EaH i = (K ′ , E i ) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, defined as follows. Each EaH i has the same key-generation algorithm, namely K ′ , which on input 1 k outputs pk, where (pk, sk) is the output of K(1 k ) with random coins. The encryption algorithms operate on vectors of size v, and are defined as follows:
Above, 0 denotes the size-v vector with each component 0 n , and hash H is extended to vectors component-wise analogously to encryption, as is the in-fix " " operation where both arguments are vectors. Consider executing A against EaH i for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} in the following game:
For the analysis, let us call a RO query public-key prefixed if it is of the form pk y for some y. Let "BAD 1 " denote the event that A m makes a public-key prefixed query to its RO. Let "BAD 2 " denote the event that A g makes a RO query of the form pk x[i] for some and i ∈ {1, . . . , v}. Lastly, let "E" denote the event that Game 1 outputs 1, and let Pr i [ · ] be the probability of the argument when Game 1 is executed with A, EaH i . We first claim that
This is clear by construction of EaH 1 , EaH 4 , taking into account the definition of the advantage of A. Now expand the above as
Towards bounding the right-hand side, we next claim that
This follows from comparing runs of B and of Game 1 with EaH 1 , EaH 2 , taking into account the definition of the advantage of B. Next we claim that
We will justify this below. Assuming it for the moment, let us next argue that
To see the first, note that A m , which makes at most q h RO queries, when executed in Game 1 against EaH 2 (or in fact any of the schemes) does not get any information about pk. To see the second, observe that when A g is executed against EaH 2 , it is not given any information about x until BAD 2 occurs. Similarly to before, we also have that
Now we substitute all these into (21) to get
Assuming wlog that
and combining like-terms then yields (4) . So it remains to prove the following.
Claim B.1
The claim is that
Proof: The claim follows from the following sequence of inequalities:
To see the third line above, consider runs of Game 1 with EaH 2 , EaH 3 and A over a common finite set of coins; note that a sequence of coins (which includes the coins for A) that cause Game 1 with EaH 2 and A to output 1 and for which both BAD 1 , BAD 2 are not true and just those that cause Game 1 with EaH 3 and A to output 1 and for which both BAD 1 , BAD 2 are not true, because if BAD 1 , BAD 2 are not true then the executions of each are identical.
Extending the proof to CCA. To extend the above proof to show PRIV-CCA security of EaH assuming IND-CCA security of the starting encryption scheme AE, adversaries B, B ′ would additionally have access to decryption oracle D(1 k , pk, sk, ·) and would simulate answers to queries of A g to oracle HD(1 k , pk, sk, ·) as follows: On query c h, check if c h ′ for any string h ′ occurs in input c to A g ; if so, return ⊥. Otherwise, compute HD(1 k , pk, sk, c h) by using oracle D(1 k , pk, sk, ·) to decrypt c and return the result to A g . This "works" because hash function H is deterministic. So, if A g submits decryption query c h such that some c h ′ occurs in its input c, then either h ′ = h (which is not a query A g is allowed to make), or else h ′ is not the hash of the decryption of c, and therefore D(1 k , pk, sk, c h) outputs ⊥. The rest of the proof remains essentially identical.
C Proof of Theorem 6.2
For simplicity, we analyze a modified scheme EaH ′ = (K, HE ′ ) where the ciphertext is dropped from the output, namely we just have HE ′ H (pk, x) = H(pk x). (This is a "hiding scheme" as defined in Section 7.) Our analysis then implies Theorem 6.2 by a simple hybrid argument. (Moreover, essentially the same hybrid argument can be used to treat PRIV-CCA security of EaH assuming IND-CCA security of AE.) As a warm-up, we start with the case that A m puts a uniform distribution on a finite set of plaintexts S.
The uniform case. Say that MR adversary A is uniform if A m puts a uniform distribution on some finite set of plaintexts S. For a uniform MR adversary A we claim that
Note that this is quite a good bound because we expect the advantage of A in this case to be about the inverse of the size of the "bucket" in which the challenge message chosen by A m lies (because A g can do no better than simply guessing at random a message from this bucket), and the expected bucket size is |S|/2 l . So the bound says that we are basically off by at most a small constant factor. To deduce it, we consider a simplified game that works as follows:
Regarding h 0 as the hash of the challenge message m, the game is, intuitively, returning how many other plaintexts besides the challenge message have hash value equal to that of the challenge message. To bound A's advantage, we would like to know how large we expect the game's output to be. For this, we define some random variables. Let S = {m 0 , m 1 , . . . , m M }. For i = 1 to M define the random variable
and define X = M i=1 X i . So Game 1 returns the value of X. Note that the X i are pairwise independent. Some simple computations that we will need are (where free variables have implicit universal quantification):
where the second is from linearity of expectation. Now, for some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 to be determined later, we claim the following inequalities, which we will justify below:
Of these, the first is by definition and the second is because dropping the second term on the right-hand side can only cause the latter to go up.
For the third, we can consider runs of Game 1 and the priv-1 experiment, over a common finite set of coins, respectively. In a run of the experiment and A, the best strategy for A g to recover challenge message x is to output at random one of the messages from S whose hash value (when concatenated with pk) is equal to its input H(pk x). Its success probability is therefore at most 1/n, where n is the number of such messages. Now look at a run of Game 1 on the same coins. Viewing h 0 as the hash of the challenge message for A g , it returns exactly n − 1. As X takes this return value, the probability (over the random coins of the experiment and A) that A recovers the challenge message when executed in the priv-1 experiment is at most
The fourth line is a conditioning argument, where we use that if
The fifth is dropping a positive factor less than 1 and the sixth is substitution according to our previous calculation of E [ X ] .
So it remains to bound the probability on the last line. For this, we claim the following.
Claim C.1 For any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we have
Proof: The claim follows from the following inequalities, which we return to justify below:
The first and last are just algebraic manipulation and substitution according to our previous calculations. The second is by Chebyshev's inequality. For the third, we use:
Of these, the first is by pairwise independence, and the second follows from the fact that for any binary-valued random variable
. The last we have already seen. Now, substituting according to the claim gives
Setting α to 1/2 and replacing M with |S| − 1 yields (22) . This completes our analysis of the uniform case.
The non-uniform case. Now consider the more general case of a MR privacy adversary A where A m does not necessarily put the uniform distribution, but instead some arbitrary distribution D, on set S of plaintexts. Let µ be the min-entropy, and set p = 2 −µ . This time, let |S| = M . For i ∈ {1, . . . , M }, let p i be the probability given to m i according to D. In this case, we claim that
To help interpret the above, first ignore the factor Coll [ D ] · |S| in the expression. Then the above is similar to what we had in the uniform case, where |S| = 2 µ ; the difference is that there is a factor of (1 − 2 −µ ) 2 now, but as long as the min-entropy is not very close to zero, the bound is still good. Looking at the Coll [ D ] · |S| factor now, we note it is a fact (which follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality) that 1/|S| ≤ Coll [ D ], with equality just when A m puts a uniform distribution on S. The closer these quantities, the better our bound. To derive (23), we generalize our previous approach and consider a simplified game that works as follows: 
The advantage of A is, as we have seen, equal to 2p − 1 where p is the probability that the adversary correctly guesses the challenge bit b in a game where we pick b at random and run the adversary with the first experiment if b = 1 and the second if b = 0. Game G 1 is exactly this game written in a convenient way. Intuitively, the game tries to pick values of H[pk x i [j]] for i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , v} used as coins for encryption upfront before running A g , but in the case that A m has already queried one of the indices to its RO the game uses its previous reply instead. We clarify that the two runs of A m have different coins but the same array H is used for the RO, so they have the same RO. Game G 1 also sets a few flags, but they do not influence game output. We have justified (24) .
Games G 1 , G 2 differ only in statements that follow the setting of bad 0 , meaning are, in the terminology of [14] , identical-until-bad 0 games. The Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [14] thus applies to justify (25) . The probability that H[pk x i [j]] for fixed i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , v} is defined, meaning pk x i [j] was queried by A m to its RO, is at most 2q h · mpk AE because A m gets no information about pk. (The factor of 2 is due to the fact that A m is run twice.) Summing over all possible values of i, j, we obtain (26) .
The Finalize procedure of Game G 3 begins by defining its output bit d in certain ways depending on the flags zer, one if either of these are true, and otherwise defining it as in G 2 . However, in case the value of d set by the first two "If" statements is wrong, meaning not equal to b, the third "If" statement corrects, setting d to b. The net result is that in the cases that G 3 assigns d differently from G 2 , the assignment made by G 3 is correct, meaning equal to b. Additionally, G 3 sets a flag bad, but this does not influence its choice of d. So the probability that the output of A g equals b can only go up. We have justified (27) .
As before, the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [14] applies to justify (28) . The probability that A g makes a hash query x ∈ x 1−b when executed with G 3 is at most q h v/2 µ because A g gets no information about x 1−b . This justifies (29) .
As in the proof of the Fundamental Lemma in [14] , we can consider a common finite space of coins associated to the executions of A g with either G 4 or G 5 . Consider the execution of A g with G 4 when a particular coin sequence is chosen at random from this set. One of the boxed statements in the procedure to respond to a hash query can be executed only if either one = true or zer = true, due to the "If" statements that precede the boxed statements. However, once one of these flags is set to true, the output of the Finalize procedure is determined. (Nothing further that happens in the execution can change it. Note we use here that at most one of zer, one can be true, never both, and once one of them is true, it never becomes false.) This means that the boxed statements have no effect on the output of the game, and eliminating them results in the equivalent game G 5 . We have justified (30) . (To prove Theorem 5.1, we would basically be done at this point.)
Again, the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [14] applies to justify (31) . When executed in Game G 5 , the probability that a decryption query y made by A g to is a valid ciphertext for some message m such that A g has not queried pk x to its hash oracle is at most mc AE . This is because, without any information about H[pk x], H[pk x] and the coins used by E(pk, x) have the same distribution from the perspective of A g . This implies (32) .
Notice that the assignment to x to D(sk, y) in the procedure to respond to decryption queries in Game G 6 does not influence the output of the procedure. To make this explicit, we drop this assignment and the associated code from this procedure to yield an equivalent game G 7 . Similarly to before, Game G 7 is now just the game defining the advantage of B written in a convenient way. The code for B does not set flags bad 0 , bad 1 whereas G 7 makes some "If" checks and sets these flags, but these flags do not affect the game output. We have justified (33) . Re-arranging yields (5) .
Finally, to justify the claim about the running-time of B, recall the convention to include in the running-time of A that of its overlying experiment. So, in addition to the time to run A, B's time-complexity is dominated by the time needed to create a hash table containing the elements of x 0 , x 1 , which is O(vn), as well as for encrypting each hash query made by A g . So its additional overhead is O(vn + q h T E ), as asserted.
On query H 2 (z x): 
